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MONITORING COMPLIANCE  
WITH UNRATIFIED TREATIES:  
THE ILO EXPERIENCE 
 
LAURENCE R. HELFER* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In The Concept of International Delegation, the introductory article to this 
symposium, Curtis Bradley and Judith Kelley categorize international 
delegations according to three factors: type of delegated authority, legal effect, 
and independence of the international body.1 The authors apply this typology to 
a diverse array of intergovernmental organizations (IOs), tribunals, treaty 
secretariats, and commissions. And they usefully include in their definition not 
only international bodies empowered to issue legally binding rules, but also 
those whose authority is limited to adopting “nonbinding resolutions, policy 
proposals, or advisory opinions.”2 
This article analyzes a hybrid form of delegation that combines these hard- 
and soft-law elements: grants of authority to international bodies to monitor 
compliance with unratified treaties and other nonbinding norms and standards.3 
It studies the costs and benefits of this hybrid delegated power by reviewing the 
history and functions of the International Labor Organization (ILO). 
The ILO is among the world’s oldest IOs, but it is also one of the most 
ignored.4 According to the prevailing conventional wisdom, “most reasonably 
informed people have little idea what the letters I-L-O stand for,” and even 
labor economists and trade specialists are mostly uninterested in the 
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 1. Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Winter 2008).  
 2. Id. at 4. 
 3. See id. at 33 (encouraging scholars to give greater attention to “soft delegation[s]”). 
 4. To their credit, Bradley and Kelley refer to the powers and functions of the ILO at several 
points in their article. See id. at 13 (mentioning the ILO’s investigative powers); id. at 15, 29 
(mentioning the ILO’s agenda-setting authority); id. at 32 n.111 (referring to the ILO as an 
international institution that has expanded its authority over time). 
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organization’s work.5 A principal reason for the ILO’s inconspicuous profile is 
the widely held perception that the organization is the “90-pound weakling of 
UN agencies,” a “toothless tiger,” that has little effect on improving global 
labor conditions.6 
This article challenges the view that the ILO’s delegated authority is 
inconsequential. It does so by analyzing the power of ILO officials and review 
bodies to monitor compliance with treaties and recommendations that the 
organization has adopted but that a member state has not ratified or otherwise 
accepted as legally binding.7 
As explained in greater detail below, such monitoring has three distinct 
consequences. It reduces the competitive advantages that a member state might 
otherwise receive from refusing to ratify treaties that the ILO adopts. It makes 
it more difficult for a state to cheat surreptitiously and capture those unilateral 
advantages.8 And it provides a mechanism for domestic interest groups to 
challenge government practices that are inconsistent with international legal 
standards, including those that the government has not formally accepted.9 
The ILO membership has repeatedly expanded these monitoring powers 
since the organization’s founding in 1919. It has done so both informally (by 
allowing ILO officials to broaden the scope of the delegation that established 
the organization) and formally (by amending the ILO constitution to codify and 
further enlarge the organization’s monitoring authority). 
This historical trend is at odds with the principal–agent theory that many 
scholars use to study international delegations.10 According to this theory, 
member states (principals) tightly control the authority they confer upon IOs 
 
 5. KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE 
UNDER GLOBALIZATION? 93 (2003). 
 6. Id. at 95, 102; see also Sean Cooney, Testing Times for the ILO: Institutional Reform for the 
New International Political Economy, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 365, 399 (1999) (stating that the 
ILO is “[v]iewed by many as a ‘slow, cumbersome and low-profile institution’ . . . [that] has not made 
the impact it should in the new political economy”) (internal citation omitted); William A. Douglas et 
al., An Effective Confluence of Forces in Support of Workers’ Rights: ILO Standards, US Trade Laws, 
Unions, and NGOs, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 273, 276 (2004) (noting “frequent allegations that the ILO ‘has no 
teeth,’ and that its work consequently makes little difference in the labor practices of governments”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 7. For descriptions of this monitoring power, see JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 331 (2005) (opining that the ILO engages in treaty-making “with 
strings attached”); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Specialized Law-Making Processes, in UNITED NATIONS 
LEGAL ORDER 109, 116, 115 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995) (characterizing the 
ILO as “a super-treaty system” and observing that “a state—merely by being a member of the ILO—
incurs significant responsibilities, and subjects itself to peer pressure, regarding not only conventions it 
ratifies, but also those of which it disapproves”). 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. See infra Part II.C (discussing the Committee on Freedom of Association). 
 10. For a recent series of essays applying principal–agent theory to IOs, see DELEGATION AND 
AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Darren Hawkins et al. eds., 2006). For a different 
perspective that considers IO officials and staff as autonomous actors, see MICHAEL BARNETT & 
MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL 
POLITICS 2–3, 158 (2004) (arguing that “IOs are active agents in their own change,” agents that have a 
“propensity toward dysfunctional, even pathological, behavior”). 
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(agents), 11 and any attempt by those agents to augment their autonomy will be 
met with swift corrective action.12 Principal–agent theory would not have 
predicted that ILO member states would repeatedly endorse the efforts of ILO 
officials and review bodies to augment their delegated powers. 
Entrusting the ILO with the authority to monitor unratified treaties also sits 
uneasily with a basic tenet of the international legal system. As the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties unequivocally states, “[a] treaty does not 
create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”13 This 
bedrock rule legitimizes international delegations and helps to reconcile them 
with domestic authority. Oona Hathaway’s contribution to this symposium 
makes this point expressly: “[T]he power to accept or reject an international 
agreement is the power to accept or reject a delegation of authority.”14 A state 
that transfers a portion of that power to an IO may consent, as a formal matter, 
to the monitoring functions the organization later undertakes.15 But it also 
contracts away an essential attribute of its sovereignty, making the ILO an 
important case study for a symposium on the costs and benefits of international 
delegation. 
How the ILO acquired the authority to police compliance with unratified 
treaties and recommendations is not widely known outside a small coterie of 
international labor-law enthusiasts.16 To remedy that omission, Part II of this 
article reviews the essential features of the organization’s delegation history. It 
reveals that the ILO membership created and expanded the organization’s 
monitoring powers in response to changes in its economic and political 
environment and to independent initiatives by the ILO Directors General and 
the organization’s secretariat, the ILO Office. Part II also illustrates how, as a 
formal matter, these delegations imposed sovereignty costs upon all member 
states, but in practice often created benefits that disproportionately accrued to 
powerful ILO member countries. 
Part III assesses the implications of the ILO’s experience for Bradley and 
Kelley’s delegation typology. It first expands the monitoring and enforcement 
 
 11. As Bradley and Kelley make clear, the actors who serve as agents include not only IO officials 
and staff but also IO member states acting collectively. See Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 6–9. 
 12. See Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, 
and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 
supra note 10, at 3, 27–37. 
 13. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see also 
LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 28 (1995) (“For treaties, consent is 
essential. No treaty, old or new, whatever its character or subject, is binding on a state unless it has 
consented to it.”). 
 14. Oona A. Hathaway, International Delegation and State Sovereignty, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 123 (Winter 2008). 
 15. But see id. at 124–43 (questioning whether formal consent is sufficient to legitimate states’ 
adherence to international legal rules). 
 16. For a detailed interdisciplinary analysis of the ILO’s rich and varied history, see Laurence R. 
Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 
59 VAND. L. REV. 649 (2006). 
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delegations analyzed by the authors17 to include delegations that authorize 
international bodies to monitor compliance with nonbinding international rules. 
Part III reveals that this type of monitoring authority is not confined to the 
ILO, but also exists in several other international institutions and issue areas. It 
then explains why the Bradley–Kelley typology’s emphasis on the formal 
characteristics of delegations (such as the type of authority granted and its legal 
effect) can usefully be supplemented with an analysis of how delegations 
actually operate in practice. Considering how monitoring delegations function 
“on the ground,” so to speak, also better equips scholars to study how and why 
delegated authority changes over time. 
Part IV considers what insights the ILO offers for other international 
delegations. It argues that the ability to monitor compliance with unratified 
treaties and nonbinding recommendations provides a mechanism for IOs to 
encourage all member nations affected by transborder cooperation problems to 
aid international efforts to address those problems rather than free-ride on the 
actions of other countries. 
II 
MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH  
UNRATIFIED INTERNATIONAL LABOR TREATIES 
This Part reviews the history of the ILO’s authority to monitor compliance 
with nonbinding recommendations and unratified conventions. It explains why 
the ILO’s founders gave the organization this distinctive power and why ILO 
officials and the ILO membership have augmented that power at key points in 
the organization’s history. 
A. The Founding of the ILO and the Expansion of International Monitoring 
Authority by ILO Officials 
The nations that founded the ILO after the First World War sought to 
combat the myriad hazards of the early 20th century workplace by creating a 
new rulemaking body to promulgate and enforce international labor standards. 
A critical challenge facing the new organization was how to apply those 
standards as widely as possible. The ILO’s founders recognized that “the failure 
of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of 
other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries.”18 
This statement succinctly captures the proverbial race-to-the-bottom, in which 
each country lowers its labor standards in a bid to attract foreign investment or 
to aid its domestic industries. Such efforts are ultimately futile. They leave all 
 
 17. See Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 12–14. 
 18. Constitution of the International Labour Organization pmbl., June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712, 225 
C.T.I.A. 373 [hereinafter 1919 ILO CONSTITUTION]. 
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countries with the same share of trade and investment but fewer protections for 
workers after the race has run its course.19 
One way to avoid these self-defeating labor policies was to create a true 
international legislature with the authority to promulgate rules that would 
automatically bind each member state. Prior to the First World War, several 
workers’ organizations lobbied for the creation of an IO with these broad 
lawmaking powers.20 More surprisingly, the French and Italian government 
delegations to the Versailles peace conference endorsed the workers’ demands, 
and the British delegation proposed a compromise in which member states 
would, absent exceptional domestic opposition, be required to ratify labor 
conventions within one year of their adoption.21 
The founding governments ultimately rejected both proposals, revealing 
their opposition to delegating substantial legislative authority to the nascent 
organization. However, the governments took the equally unprecedented step 
of granting membership to independent worker and employer representatives 
from each country.22 This tripartite membership structure ensured that nonstate 
actors with a direct stake in the industrial workplace would be involved in 
creating and monitoring international labor rules. For example, the adoption of 
treaties required only a two-thirds vote of the entire ILO membership, with the 
result that “in an extreme case a [d]raft convention . . . might be adopted even 
when the majority of [g]overnment delegates voted against it.”23 
To provide a counterweight to this tripartite treaty-making structure, 
member states reserved to themselves the discretion to ratify or reject any 
convention that the organization adopted. But states were not entirely free to 
ignore treaties they disfavored. Rather, the ILO constitution required all 
member nations to submit the treaties to their respective political branches, 
which would then consider “the enactment of legislation or other action.”24 If, 
however, the state ultimately refused to ratify the treaty, “no further obligation 
[would] rest upon the Member.”25 
 
 19. Helfer, supra note 16, at 673–74. 
 20. See ANTONY ALCOCK, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION 16–17 
(1971). 
 21. See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, ILO, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION: THE FIRST 
DECADE 68–69 (1931) [hereinafter ILO, THE FIRST DECADE]. 
 22. “Representatives of governments, organized labor, and employers . . . participate in the work 
of the ILO in a ratio of 2-1-1, respectively. Worker and employer delegates . . . . form separate caucuses 
and often vote with their respective groups rather than with their governments.” Helfer, supra note 16, 
at 651. 
 23. ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 21, at 69. In practice, the ILO has nearly always adopted 
conventions by large majorities of governments, workers, and employer delegates. See also TORSTEN 
LANDELIUS, WORKERS, EMPLOYERS AND GOVERNMENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
DELEGATIONS AND GROUPS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 1919–1964 66–91 
(1965). 
 24. 1919 ILO CONSTITUTION, supra note 18, art. 405. See also Bradley & Kelly, supra note 1, at 15 
(analyzing this as an example of agenda-setting authority). 
 25. 1919 ILO CONSTITUTION, supra note 18, art. 405. 
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The ILO’s founders intended this mandatory submission to encourage the 
widespread ratification of international labor conventions.26 It soon became 
clear, however, that the procedure would not ensure universal adherence to the 
treaties. The absence of a common global baseline for protecting workers and 
regulating workplace conditions risked undermining the organization’s core 
objectives. Specifically, a state not bound by the treaties could exploit its 
competitive position to the detriment of other member nations, triggering anew 
the race to the bottom that the ILO’s founders had feared. 
The ILO Office responded to this threat by adopting two procedural 
innovations that encouraged treaty ratifications. First, the Office acquired an 
informal power of interpretation, which it used to reassure states that had 
refrained from ratifying conventions whose provisions were ambiguous. As the 
Director–General stated in a 1921 report, “Before ratifying, certain States have 
wished to know exactly to what degree . . . a clause of a Convention might bind 
them, or to what extent their existing legislation met the provisions of the 
Convention.”27 Beginning in that year, the ILO Office responded to these 
queries and published them for the benefit of other member states.28 The Office 
had no authority to interpret labor conventions, a function that the ILO 
constitution entrusted to the Permanent Court of International Justice.29 States 
were unwilling to invoke this formal adjudicatory process, however, leading the 
Office to provide unofficial interpretations of the treaties. The result was a 
substantial expansion of the initial delegation to ILO officials.30 Armed with this 
new de facto power, the Office published interpretations that sought to 
“remove[] [the] obstacles inhibiting ratification” of ILO conventions.31 
ILO officials used a second procedural innovation to encourage treaty 
ratifications while simultaneously expanding their own authority. They 
collected and published information on compliance with unratified conventions 
and nonbinding recommendations. The Office justified this practice on 
functional grounds, as a way to improve the legal and technical assistance it 
provided to the entire ILO membership. Over time, however, this information-
gathering exercise blurred the distinction between ratified and unratified 
 
 26. See E. A. LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THIRTY YEARS 
OF I.L.O. EXPERIENCE 12 (1966). 
 27. J.F. McMahon, The Legislative Techniques of the International Labour Organization, 41 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 88 (1965–66) (quoting Report of the Director, Proceedings of the International Labour 
Conference, 3d Sess. 57 (1921)). 
 28. See C. Wilfred Jenks, The Interpretation of International Labour Conventions by the 
International Labour Office, 20 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 132 (1939). 
 29. 1919 ILO CONSTITUTION, supra note 18, art. 423. 
 30. ALVAREZ, supra note 7, at 226 (“The ILO secretariat, without explicit constitutional warrant, 
[became] the principal organ for rendering these effectively conclusive but formally ‘advisory’ 
interpretations.”). 
 31. McMahon, supra note 27, at 100. 
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treaties, reducing hurdles to ratifying any single labor convention but increasing 
the sovereignty costs of the initial delegation of authority to the organization.32 
B. Codifying the Authority to Monitor Compliance With Unratified Treaties 
At the close of the Second World War, the ILO’s tripartite membership 
convened a constitutional conference to consider the organization’s place in the 
post-war legal order. The result was a major overhaul of the organization’s 
founding charter and an expansion of its treaty-monitoring authority. In 
particular, the new ILO constitution codified states’ obligation to explain 
whether they complied with unratified conventions and to identify any 
impediments to future ratification.33 The constitution also required states to 
disclose whether they had implemented the organization’s nonbinding 
recommendations.34 
Strikingly, these formal expansions of the organization’s monitoring powers 
were supported by the representatives of all three branches of the ILO 
membership—including the member states themselves. An employer delegate 
from the United Kingdom was the most vociferous proponent of the reforms.35 
But his proposals were, on the whole, supported by other government, worker, 
and employer representatives.36 
A few delegates endorsed the new monitoring powers on normative 
grounds, as a first step toward the creation of “a code of basic labour conditions 
which all Members of the organisation will be bound to put into legislative 
effect and to carry out effectively as a condition of” membership.37 Others, 
especially government representatives, supported the amendments for strategic 
reasons. The United States, for example, had relatively high domestic labor 
standards but had not ratified many ILO conventions because of federalism 
 
 32. See ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION 253 (1964) [hereinafter HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION STATE] (characterizing the 
ILO’s “indirect practice of studying the impact of unratified Conventions” as an “accretion[] in 
institutional autonomy and responsibility”); ILO, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 21, at 267–76, 310–
12, 317–20 (reviewing efforts by the ILO Office to overcome obstacles to ratification of conventions 
and to gather information on the implementation of recommendations). 
 33. Constitution of the International Labour Organization art. 19, § 5 cl. (e) (as amended Oct. 9, 
1946), 62 Stat. 3485, 15 U.N.T.S. 35 [hereinafter 1946 ILO CONSTITUTION] (requiring nonratifying 
member states to “report . . . at appropriate intervals . . . the position of its law and practice in regard to 
the matters dealt with in the Convention, showing the extent to which effect has been given, or is 
proposed to be given, to any of the provisions of the Convention by legislation, administrative action, 
collective agreement or otherwise and stating the difficulties which prevent or delay the ratification of 
such Convention”). 
 34. Id. at art. 19, § 6 cl. (d) (requiring member states to “report . . . at appropriate intervals . . . the 
position of the law and practice in their country in regard to the matters dealt with in the 
Recommendation, showing the extent to which effect has been given, or is proposed to be given, to the 
provisions of the Recommendation and such modifications of these provisions as it has been found or 
may be found necessary to make in adopting or applying them”). 
 35. See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, ILO, OFFICIAL BULLETIN, vol. XXVII Constitutional Questions 
179, 420, 464–66 (Dec. 15, 1945) [hereinafter ILO, Constitutional Questions]. 
 36. See id. 181, 537, 553, 650, 714, 718, 947. 
 37. Id. at 470 (amendments proposed by Sir John Forbes Watson). 
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concerns.38 The organization’s monitoring of compliance with unratified treaties 
thus engendered few sovereignty costs for the United States. But it created a 
useful procedure to highlight weak labor standards in other countries, including 
countries that were competitively advantaged by maintaining minimal worker- 
and workplace protections.39 
Equipped with these new powers, ILO monitoring bodies began to gather 
information on compliance with unratified treaties. The reports that 
governments filed with these bodies were sometimes “onerous” and 
“embarrassing.”40 By the 1960s, however, a majority of member states were 
regularly or intermittently submitting information on these nonbinding 
instruments.41 
Echoing its pre-war practice, the ILO Office soon enhanced these delegated 
powers. It did so by broadly interpreting member states’ constitutional 
obligation to submit ILO conventions and recommendations to their domestic 
“authorities . . . for the enactment of legislation or other action.”42 In a 1959 
memorandum, the Office defined such authorities as “the bod[ies] empowered 
to legislate in respect of the questions to which the Convention or 
Recommendation relates, i.e.[,] as a rule, the Parliament.”43 The memorandum 
opined that states were required to submit every adopted ILO legal instrument 
to these authorities, not merely the smaller number of treaties and 
recommendations that the government intended to ratify or implement. The 
Office also interpreted the constitution as requiring such submissions to “always 
be accompanied by . . . a statement or proposals setting out the government’s 
views as to the action to be taken on the instruments. It would not be sufficient 
merely to append the text of the decisions . . . without making any proposal.”44 
The Office’s interpretation of the ILO constitution enhanced the delegation 
of agenda-setting and informational authority to the organization. Perhaps most 
strikingly, the Office’s memorandum gave an international organization 
 
 38. Concerns that United States membership in the ILO would upset the balance between federal 
and state power were first expressed at the time of the organization’s founding, and they persisted after 
the United States joined the organization in 1934. See Pitman B. Potter, Inhibitions Upon the Treaty-
Making Power of the United States, 28 AM. J. INT’L L. 456 (1934). 
 39. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE, supra note 32, at 545–46 n.73 (stating that, because of 
“the high level of American labor standards,” the United States “gladly agreed to the suggestion that 
all member states submit periodic reports on the degree of implementation of [ILO treaties] 
irrespective of formal ratification”). The United States did, however, successfully defeat a proposal for 
a constitutional provision obligating member states periodically to resubmit unratified conventions to 
their respective national legislatures. Id.; see also ILO, Constitutional Questions, supra note 35, at 759 
(statement of Sir John Forbes Watson that “[s]uch a country as the United States did not under the 
present system receive its due credit for the advanced character of its social conditions, and [that] some 
way of formally recognising these advanced standards was necessary”). 
 40. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE, supra note 32, at 264. 
 41. See id. at 265, tbl.5. 
 42. 1946 ILO CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, art. 19, § 5 cl. (b). 
 43. Int’l Labour Office, ILO, Memorandum Concerning the Obligation to Submit Conventions and 
Recommendations to the Competent Authorities (1959), Appl. 195 (Rev. 1), quoted in McMahon, supra 
note 27, at 18. 
 44. McMahon, supra note 27, at 18. 
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agenda-setting power over domestic lawmaking processes by requiring 
governments to submit all treaties to the legislature and to take a position on 
whether the treaties should be ratified. Such domestic agenda-setting power—
which is included in Bradley and Kelley’s capacious typology—is far more 
constraining of sovereignty than a delegation to set the rulemaking agenda of 
an international body.45 
Of course, member states retained the ultimate prerogative to accept or 
reject any labor treaty or recommendation that the organization had adopted. 
But the costs of doing so were increased by the monitoring authority exercised 
by ILO officials. Not only were states obligated to submit legal instruments to 
their domestic legislatures, they were also required to disclose the details of that 
submissions process to the ILO and to domestic worker and employer groups.46 
Whenever lawmakers declined to ratify a treaty, the state was required to 
explain whether it intended to implement any of its provisions “by legislation, 
administrative action, collective agreement or otherwise” and to indicate “the 
difficulties which prevent or delay the ratification of such Convention.”47 
The Office used these monitoring powers to promote the ratification and 
implementation of labor treaties and recommendations.48 According to one 
commentator of the period, “the recurrent pressure and exposure to which 
States were subjected [was] greatly intensified and States were placed in a 
position in which they had to justify to other member States their refusal to 
ratify a particular convention or implement a certain recommendation.”49 In 
some countries, the ILO’s information-gathering and monitoring authority 
“provided a stimulus to governments to examine the law and practice in regard 
to those . . . Conventions which they had not ratified.”50 Other nations—
principally developing and communist countries—“apparently prefer[red] 
defiance of the rules to the risks of exposure.”51 The recalcitrance of this latter 
group of states served as the backdrop for the creation of a new monitoring 
procedure authorizing labor unions to file complaints against member states for 
infringing the right to freedom of association. 
C. The Committee on Freedom of Association 
In the late 1940s, with Cold War rivalries intensifying, the ILO and the 
newly created United Nations faced a mounting wave of worker protests 
concerning the suppression of trade unions. In response to these allegations, the 
two organizations established a joint fact-finding and conciliation commission to 
 
 45. See Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 46. McMahon, supra note 27, at 15. 
 47. 1946 ILO CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, art. 19, § 5 cl. (e). 
 48. INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, ILO, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 11–26 (1976); see also E.A. Landy, The Influence of International Labour 
Standards: Possibilities and Performance, 101 INT’L LAB. REV. 555, 563 (1970). 
 49. Landy, supra note 48, at 563. 
 50. Id. at 564 (quoting an Australian government official). 
 51. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE, supra note 32, at 265. 
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conduct impartial investigations and assist governments in resolving these 
disputes. However, a state’s consent was required before the commission could 
review any allegations against it.52 When Peru, the state against which the first 
complaint was filed, refused to give its consent, worker groups lobbied the 
Governing Body—the ILO’s executive arm, composed of a subgroup of 
governments, employers, and workers, including ten permanent seats reserved 
for states of “chief industrial importance”53—to establish an alternative 
mechanism to review the allegations against that country.54 
The Governing Body acceded to the workers’ demands and created a new 
tripartite Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) in 1951.55 Nominally, 
the CFA possessed only a narrow procedural mandate—to filter complaints 
alleging violations of trade union rights and decide whether they warranted 
submission to the Governing Body. For complaints that survived this screening 
procedure, the Governing Body was to seek the consent of the defendant state 
to submit the dispute to the joint conciliation commission. 
Within a few months of its creation, however, the CFA had effectively 
supplanted the commission, with the result that a “supposedly harmless 
procedural device [was transformed into] a mechanism for investigating the 
merits of a case.”56 The Committee’s screening functions quickly evolved into “a 
full investigation of the facts and . . . an effort at ILO conciliation and 
pressure.”57 In assessing the CFA’s disposition of hundreds of trade-union 
complaints, commentators of the period described this transformation as a 
“revolutionary” expansion of the ILO’s monitoring authority.58 
Several institutional features of the CFA support this characterization. First, 
as a product of the ILO’s tripartite lawmaking processes, the committee, unlike 
the conciliation commission, operated “free from the consent requirement.”59 In 
addition, the Governing Body authorized the CFA to review complaints against 
all ILO member states, including countries that had not ratified two recently 
 
 52. See id. at 381–83. 
 53. See Int’l Labour Office, ILO, Election of the Officers of the Governing Body for 2000–01, 
GB.278/1 (June 2000), available at www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb278/pdf/gb-
1.pdf. The ten “states of chief industrial importance” are Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, 
India, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. 
 54. See HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE, supra note 32, at 381–83; ERNST B. HAAS, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION: THE CASE OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 25–30 (1970) 
[hereinafter HAAS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION]; C. WILFRED JENKS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF TRADE UNION FREEDOM 187–200 (George W. Keeton & George 
Schwarzenberger eds., 1957). 
 55. DAVID TAJGMAN & KAREN CURTIS, INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, ILO, FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION: A USER’S GUIDE ix (2000), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/download/resources/freedomassociation.pdf. 
 56. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE, supra note 32, at 383. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Nicolas Valticos, Les méthodes de la protection internationale de la liberté syndicale, in 144 
RECUEIL DES COURS, COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
77 (1975). 
 59. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE, supra note 32, at 383. 
07__HELFER.DOC 6/9/2008  8:05:18 AM 
Winter 2008] MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH UNRATIFIED TREATIES 203 
adopted conventions protecting freedom of association and trade-union rights.60 
The CFA nevertheless viewed these two treaties “as the relevant yardsticks for 
blaming or exonerating governments, irrespective of whether they have ratified 
these texts.”61 
As a formal matter, the CFA derived its authority to monitor compliance 
with these unratified treaties from the ILO constitution, which references 
freedom of association in its preamble.62 The Committee asserted that, by 
recognizing this right in the constitution, states had implicitly sanctioned its 
review powers “by virtue of their membership [in] the Organization alone.”63 In 
fact, this cloak of constitutional authority was quite threadbare. “The complaint 
procedure that evolved came about without formal conventional or 
constitutional sanction.”64 Remarkably, no state attempted to challenge the 
CFA’s powers. To the contrary, over the next fifty years the Committee 
reviewed thousands of complaints from workers groups and issued nearly 2,500 
decisions concerning a wide range of labor-rights issues.65 
Why would ILO member states agree to create such an intrusive monitoring 
regime? And, even more surprisingly, why would they acquiesce in the CFA’s 
arrogation of new monitoring powers? Competition between rival IOs provides 
a partial answer. The newly formed United Nations Economic and Social 
Council had claimed jurisdiction over labor rights, a subject formerly within the 
ILO’s exclusive domain. The CFA—whose creation several UN bodies had 
opposed—provided a highly visible way for the ILO membership to counter this 
threat to the organization’s policy dominance.66 
A different explanation is provided by Ernst Haas, whose magisterial mid-
century study of the ILO answers these questions by analyzing the Cold War 
rivalries then pervading the organization: 
 
 60. ILO, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, ILOLEX No. 
C087 (July 9, 1948) [hereinafter ILO, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C087 (last visited Feb. 1, 2008); 
ILO, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, ILOLEX No. C098 (July 1, 1949) 
[hereinafter ILO, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention], available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C098 (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). 
 61. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE, supra note 32, at 407–08; see also Philip Alston, ‘Core 
Labour Standards’ and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 457, 481 (2004) (stating that the CFA examined “allegations in situations in which the government 
concerned had neither ratified [the relevant conventions] nor given its voluntary agreement to the ILO 
to consider the matter”). 
 62. 1946 ILO CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, pmbl. (recognizing “the principle of freedom of 
association”). 
 63. N. VALTICOS & G. VON POTOBSKY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 295 (1995); see also 
HAAS, supra note 32, at 407–08 (stating that “the ILO Constitution[’s] capacity to generate binding 
norms” provided the authority for the CFA to review complaints against all ILO member states). 
 64. HAAS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION, supra note 54, at 27. 
 65. See ERIC GRAVEL ET AL., THE COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: ITS IMPACT 
OVER 50 YEARS 10–11 (2002).  
 66. See JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS & THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 
83–84 (1984); Virginia A. Leary, Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour Organisation, 
in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 580, 602–03 (Philip Alston 
ed., 1992). 
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The major democracies never liked the Committee, but they learned to live with it as 
the best way to counter communist charges with full publicity. . . . The Soviets . . . took 
special delight in exploiting the procedure for anti-colonial and Cold War purposes, 
and thus could not very well denounce the machinery when it was turned against 
them.67 
In short, the CFA was born and thrived because democratic and socialist 
countries, trade unions, and ILO officials all believed that the complaints 
procedure served their respective interests. As a result, these actors supported 
or “acquiesce[d] in a totally unplanned growth in [the Committee’s] 
institutional competence.”68 
D. The Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
The ILO’s most recent expansion of its authority to monitor compliance 
with unratified treaties is also its most ambitious. In the mid-1990s, the 
organization faced a crisis.69 It feared being eclipsed by the new and powerful 
WTO, which was considering adding labor standards to its mandate at the 
urging of industrialized countries and civil society groups. The crisis came to a 
head at a 1996 WTO ministerial meeting. The trade ministers recognized the 
relationship between free trade and labor, but rejected calls to enforce labor 
standards with WTO sanctions. Instead, the ministers “propel[led] the issue 
back into the ILO’s court by reasserting . . . the importance of the core rights 
dimension of globalization and the leading role of the ILO in managing that 
issue.”70 
The ministers’ actions served as a catalyst for the ILO to return to first 
constitutional principles. Taking a page from the WTO’s book—in particular, 
its rule that states must accept a package of treaty commitments as a condition 
of joining the organization—the ILO membership, assisted by the ILO Office, 
developed a mechanism to apply core labor standards to all member states 
regardless of whether they had ratified the treaties that protected those 
standards. The result was the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work.71 Understanding how the Declaration increases the delegation 
costs for some ILO member states requires a detailed analysis of the contents 
and the genesis of this distinctive document. 
The text of the Declaration succinctly restates four core labor rights—
freedom of association, the elimination of forced labor, the abolition of child 
labor, and nondiscrimination in employment—protected in eight 
 
 67. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE, supra note 32, at 415–16. 
 68. Id. at 383. 
 69. For a more detailed discussion of this crisis, see Helfer, supra note 16, at 705–07. 
 70. Brian A. Langille, Core Labour Rights—The True Story (Reply to Alston), 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
409, 421 (2005). 
 71. ILO, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ILOLEX No. 261998 
(June 19, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 Declaration], available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). 
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“fundamental” ILO conventions.72 It requires member states “to respect, to 
promote and to realize, in good faith[,]” the “principles concerning the[se] 
fundamental rights.”73 Because these obligations emanate from the ILO 
constitution—in particular its provisions for monitoring unratified treaties and 
nonbinding recommendations—they apply to all member states without regard 
to the treaties they have adopted or their level of economic development.74 By 
nominally anchoring these commitments in “the very fact of membership in the 
Organization,”75 the Declaration ingeniously mimics the WTO’s single-
undertaking approach using the ILO’s existing constitutional architecture. 
In addition to its normative provisions, the Declaration creates a new 
monitoring procedure to review government- and private-sector conduct.76 The 
ILO has given this “follow-up mechanism” a high degree of institutional 
support and funding.77 The mechanism includes two components—an annual 
performance review of countries that have not joined all eight fundamental 
conventions, and an annual “Global Report” that addresses one of the 
protected rights in depth. The performance review singles out the practices of 
nonratifying nations for special scrutiny.78 By contrast, “[t]he aim of each Global 
Report is to provide an overall picture of the trends and evolution with respect 
to the right concerned, both in countries which have ratified the relevant 
conventions, and in those which have not.”79 
 
 72. The eight fundamental conventions are: ILO, Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise Convention, supra note 60; ILO, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, supra note 60; ILO, Forced Labour Convention, ILOLEX No. C029 (June 28, 1930), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C029 (last visited Feb. 1, 2008); ILO, Abolition 
of Forced Labour Convention, ILOLEX No. C105 (June 25, 1957), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C105 (last visited Feb. 1, 2008); ILO, Equal Remuneration 
Convention, ILOLEX No. C100 (June 29, 1951), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/convde.pl?C100 (last visited Feb. 1, 2008); ILO, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention, ILOLEX No. C111 (June 25, 1958), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/convde.pl?C111 (last visited Feb. 1, 2008); ILO, Minimum Age Convention, ILOLEX No. C138 
(June 26, 1973), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C138 (last visited Feb. 1, 2008); 
ILO, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, ILOLEX No. C182 (June 17, 1999), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C182 (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). 
 73. 1998 Declaration, supra note 71, ¶ 2. The operative paragraph of the Declaration provides that 
“all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in question, have an obligation arising 
from the very fact of membership in the Organization, to respect, to promote and to realize, in good 
faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which 
are the subject of those Conventions.” Id. 
 74. See Brian A. Langille, The ILO and the New Economy: Recent Developments, 15 INT’L J. 
COMP. LAB. L. & IND. REL. 229, 244–45 (1999). 
 75. 1998 Declaration, supra note 71, ¶ 2. 
 76. ILO, Follow-up to the Declaration, ILOLEX No. 261998 (June 19, 1998), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). 
 77. See Francis Maupain, Revitalization Not Retreat: The Real Potential of the 1998 ILO 
Declaration for the Universal Protection of Workers’ Rights, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 439, 444–46 (2005). 
 78. See Francis Maupain, The Liberalization of International Trade and the Universal Recognition 
of Workers’ Fundamental Rights: The New ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work and Its Follow-Up, in SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
35, 45 (Linos-Alexander Sicilianos & Maria Gavouneli eds., 2001). 
 79. Maupain,  supra note 77, at 445. 
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What did ILO member states hope to accomplish by creating these new 
obligations and monitoring mechanisms? According to some observers, not 
very much. For these commentators, the Declaration is little more than 
institutional window dressing and is not intended to have significant real-world 
consequences.80 Two attributes of the Declaration might be viewed as 
supporting this assessment: first, that a large majority of the ILO membership 
endorsed the document, and second, that the Declaration essentially restates 
commitments already contained in the ILO constitution. Both of these 
statements are true. But the conclusion that the Declaration is merely cheap 
talk is erroneous. 
First, although the vote to adopt the Declaration—273 delegates in favor, 
none opposed, and forty-three abstentions—suggests widespread support for 
the instrument, the final tally masks significant dissention among governments, 
workers, and employers.81 As Brian Langille explains in his blow-by-blow 
account of the Declaration’s genesis, “[v]irtually every aspect of . . . the 
Declaration was contested and debated at excruciating length”82 and 
“[u]ncertainty as to whether the Declaration would be adopted existed, literally, 
to the very last moment of the [ILO’s] June conference.”83 Opponents delayed 
the vote until many delegates had left the ILO’s Geneva headquarters, hoping 
to reduce the number of delegates below the required quorum. In the end, the 
Declaration received only nine votes more than the minimum required for 
adoption.84 This behind-the-scenes portrait suggests that the Declaration was 
something ILO members believed was worth fighting (or fighting for). 
Nor can the Declaration be dismissed as a mere restatement of obligations 
already implicit in the constitution.85 To be sure, ILO officials who favored the 
 
 80. See Cooney, supra note 6, at 379–80 (stating that although the Declaration “looks promising as 
a new focus of ILO activities,” it suffers from “several shortcomings”); Patrick Macklem, Labour Law 
Beyond Borders, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 605, 619 (2002) (“Although [the Declaration] addresses some of 
the deficiencies traditionally associated with international labour standards as a mode of regulating 
transnational corporate activity, it reproduces others in new forms.”); Andrew J. Samet, Doha and 
Global Labor Standards: The Agenda Item That Wasn’t, 37 INT’L LAW. 753, 755 (2003) (criticizing the 
Declaration’s follow-up mechanism as “limited by the ILO’s failure to develop a politically potent 
process to debate and prioritize” violations); Leah F. Vosko, The Shifting Role of the ILO and the 
Struggle for Global Social Justice, 2 GLOBAL SOC. POL’Y 19, 29 (2002) (arguing that the Declaration is 
“unlikely to alter fundamentally the corporate/state-centric power relations characterizing the ILO 
historically”). 
 81. Langille, supra note 74, at 249; see also Francis Maupain, International Labor Organization 
Recommendations and Similar Instruments, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-
BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 372, 388 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (stating 
that the Declaration “initially met with great suspicion and even open hostility from some 
governments”). 
 82. Langille, supra note 74, at 248. 
 83. Id. at 231. Industrialized countries and workers organizations were, on the whole, supporters of 
the Declaration, whereas developing states and some employer groups opposed its adoption. Id. at 249. 
 84. Id. at 249. 
 85. In fact, the ILO constitution does not make reference to all of the fundamental labor rights that 
the Declaration incorporates. See Maupain, supra note 78, at 43 (noting the differences between the 
objectives mentioned by the constitution and those endorsed by the Declaration). In the decade since 
the Declaration’s adoption, however, no state has challenged its constitutional pedigree. 
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Declaration were careful to adhere to the formal trappings of state consent—
much as other IOs have done when modifying delegations in legally 
consequential ways.86 As the ILO Director General stated in 1997, 
It [the Declaration] is in no way a question of imposing . . . new obligations on 
member states against their will. The Declaration is aimed at reaffirming the logic of 
the commitments and values to which states have already freely subscribed in joining 
the ILO. . . . [N]obody could reproach the organization for inviting its members to 
take seriously such commitments by making them more explicit.87 
Yet it is just this greater specificity, together with the new monitoring 
mechanisms accompanying the Declaration, that, as a practical matter, 
increased the sovereignty costs to ILO member states.88 By augmenting the 
precision of member states’ constitutional commitments and by establishing 
new mechanisms to scrutinize their compliance with those commitments, the 
Declaration expanded the powers that states had previously delegated to the 
ILO.89 It should come as no surprise, therefore, that many observers have 
heralded the Declaration as “nothing short of a revolution in legal terms”90 and 
a “‘constitutional moment’[] in the life of the ILO.”91 
Having established that the Declaration in fact expands the ILO’s 
competence, a more difficult issue to be addressed is why member states would, 
once again, augment the organization’s authority to monitor its members’ 
compliance with unratified treaties. 
Commentators offer divergent ideational and instrumental explanations. 
For international-law optimists and ILO enthusiasts, the Declaration reflects “a 
moment of renewal and reaffirmation by the [organization’s] nearly global 
membership of basic constitutional values and commitment to social justice on 
 
 86. See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and 
Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 365 (2002) (analyzing the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations leading to the creation of the WTO and demonstrating that “GATT/WTO decision-
making rules have allowed adherence to both the instrumental reality of asymmetrical power and the 
logic of appropriateness of sovereign equality”). 
 87. GOVERNING BODY, ILO, Follow-Up on the Discussion of the Report of the Director-General to 
the 85th Session (1997) of the International Labour Conference—(a) Inclusion on the Agenda of the 86th 
Session (1998) of the  International Labour Conference of an Item Concerning a Declaration on 
Workers’ Fundamental Rights, GB.270/3/1 (November 1997), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb270/gb-3-1.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). 
 88. Enhancing the precision of international rules increases the “legalization” of those rules and 
thus increases sovereignty costs. See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L 
ORG. 401, 401–06, 412–15 (2000). Enhanced legalization also occurs when previously underenforced 
international rules become subject to new monitoring mechanisms. See Laurence R. Helfer, 
Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean 
Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1855–58 (2002). 
 89. For an analysis of the first decade of ILO monitoring of fundamental labor rights under the 
Declaration’s authority, see Int’l Lab. Office, ILO, Review of Annual Reports Under the Follow-Up to 
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, GB.295/5, 295th Sess. (Mar. 2006), 
available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.DOWNLOAD_BLOB?Var_DocumentID=59
39 (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). 
 90. Maupain, supra note 78, at 44. 
 91. Alston, supra note 61, at 459 (noting, but not endorsing, this viewpoint). 
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the basis of economic progress.”92 According to this view, the ILO responded to 
the “identity crisis” that the WTO’s rejection of a trade-labor linkage 
engendered by rededicating itself to the values and objectives that had 
animated the organization since its founding.93 
For skeptics and realists, by contrast, instrumentalist logic and a 
convergence of diverse interests explain the Declaration’s genesis. According to 
this view, the United States backed the Declaration for two reasons: first, to 
highlight its domestic protection of labor rights while obscuring its failure to 
ratify all but a handful of ILO conventions,94 and second, to legitimize its 
promotion of workers’ rights in other countries through the imposition of 
unilateral trade sanctions and the inclusion of labor-protection clauses in 
bilateral and regional trade pacts.95 Conversely, developing countries and 
employers viewed the Declaration as a way of paying lip service to the linkage 
between trade and labor while sidestepping any new labor rules in the WTO.96 
Worker groups, by contrast, emphasized the document’s focus on membership-
wide obligations and hoped that its follow-up mechanism would evolve into a 
more legalistic, complaints-driven process, as did the CFA before it.97 
The accuracy of these competing accounts of the Declaration’s origins—and 
their power to predict its future evolution and influence on international labor 
standards—remain the subjects of lively debate among ILO officials and 
academic commentators, a debate that is likely to continue for the foreseeable 
future.98 
III 
LESSONS OF THE ILO FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION 
The allocation to the ILO of the authority to monitor compliance with 
unratified labor treaties and recommendations, and the expansion of that 
authority over the course of the organization’s nearly ninety-year history, have 
three implications for the Bradley–Kelley delegation framework. 
A. The Frequency of Delegations to Monitor Compliance with Nonbinding 
International Rules 
First, the ILO’s experience suggests the need to include in the framework a 
more extensive analysis of how IOs (or their member states acting collectively) 
monitor compliance with international rules to which individual countries have 
 
 92. Langille, supra note 74, at 232 (describing, but ultimately rejecting, this view). 
 93. Id. at 233–34. 
 94. See Janet R. Bellace, The ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 17 
INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 269, 279 (2001). 
 95. See Alston, supra note 61, at 495–506. 
 96. See id. at 470–71. 
 97. See Langille, supra note 74, at 247. 
 98. See Helfer, supra note 16, at 711 (reviewing claims of the Declaration’s proponents and its 
critics and citing additional authorities); Vosko, supra note 80, at 28–32 (same). 
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not formally consented. Bradley and Kelley correctly identify delegations that 
enable international bodies to create and enforce such unconsented-to rules as 
having high sovereignty costs. But formal delegations of this kind are rare—a 
point the authors acknowledge—with the UN Security Council and European 
Union being the two most prominent examples.99 
Far more common, however, are delegations of authority to monitor states’ 
adherence to international rules without requiring them formally to recognize 
those rules as legally binding.100 The ILO’s detailed reporting obligations 
concerning unratified labor conventions and recommendations are distinctive in 
degree, but not in kind. The founding charters of the World Health 
Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), and the Council of Europe, for example, contain 
reporting requirements relating to recommendations adopted by their 
respective standard-setting bodies, although these requirements have been 
invoked only infrequently.101 
Cross-institutional delegations of authority that require states to adhere to 
formally unconsented-to legal rules are even more widespread. The interaction 
between the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law to the Sea (UNCLOS) provides a useful 
illustration. UNCLOS incorporates, by reference, generally accepted standards, 
procedures, and practices concerning various maritime matters.102 As José 
Alvarez has written, this linkage “effectively transforms a number of the IMO’s 
codes, guidelines, regulations, and recommendations [dealing with pollution 
control and navigation safety] into binding norms, even for states that may have 
not approved of these standards within the context of the IMO but have 
become parties to” UNCLOS.103 The linkage also significantly augments the 
authority of the IMO, which “has no power under its constitution to [issue] 
formally binding decisions.”104 
Cross-institutional delegations can also enable monitoring and enforcement 
by international tribunals. In the trade context, the reference to the Codex 
Alimentarius in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures and the similar reference to standards generated by the 
 
 99. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 10. The number of such delegations increases if they are 
defined to include the authority to amend regulatory schedules or annexes attached to treaties. See id. 
at 14; Bernhard Boockmann & Paul W. Thurner, Flexibility Provisions in Multilateral Environmental 
Treaties, 6 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 113, 117–25 (2006) (surveying amendment procedures in 400 
environmental agreements, protocols, and annexes). 
 100. For a comprehensive recent discussion of these issues that incorporates numerous examples 
and citations to additional authorities, see ALVAREZ, supra note 7, at 217–57. 
 101. See Kirgis, supra note 7, at 116–17, 145; Jutta Brunnée, International Legislation, in THE MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed.) (forthcoming 
2008). 
 102. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 207–12, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
243. 
 103. ALVAREZ, supra note 7, at 220. 
 104. Id. 
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International Organization for Standardization in the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade provide two high-profile examples.105 These references 
transform norms that are formally nonbinding under the charters of the IOs 
that created them into de facto legally binding rules policed by the WTO’s 
powerful dispute-settlement system. 
In each of the above examples, states expressly delegated the authority to 
monitor compliance with nonbinding norms and standards. Yet international 
decisionmakers can themselves expand existing delegations to create or 
enhance such monitoring powers. An advisory opinion by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights concluding that the nonbinding American Declaration 
on the Rights and Duties of Man had become binding by its indirect 
incorporation into the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
nicely illustrates this point.106 Relying in part on this creative and controversial 
reinterpretation of soft law as hard law, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights has reviewed individual complaints against OAS member 
nations (including the United States) that had refrained from ratifying the 
American Convention on Human Rights.107 ILO officials are thus not alone in 
arrogating to themselves the power to police international rules that states have 
not accepted as legally binding.108 
The examples discussed in this Part reveal that delegations of authority to 
monitor compliance with unratified treaties and other nonbinding international 
rules are quite common. In fact, scholars have argued that “much of the work of 
the UN specialized agencies [reflects] a conscious effort to side-step the 
question of binding effect[,] in favor of standard-setting” that elides “positivist 
distinctions between non-binding [and] binding action.”109 This finding supports 
the need for more extensive study of monitoring delegations that blur the line 
between hard and soft law. It also suggests that both governments and IO 
officials benefit by sidestepping the formal mechanisms by which states express 
their consent to be bound while, at the same time, treating those rules as de 
facto legally binding. Part IV considers this issue in greater detail. 
B. Comparing Formal Delegations to the Actual Exercise of Delegated 
Authority 
The Concept of International Delegation analyzes the sovereignty costs 
associated with formal delegations of authority to IOs and other international 
bodies. Identifying such formal delegations requires consulting treaties, statutes, 
 
 105. Id. at 220–21. 
 106. Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the 
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, 
1990 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), No. 10 (July 14, 1989). 
 107. See Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard, in COMMITMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE, supra note 81, at 393, 397–98. 
 108. The United States has repeatedly and vociferously objected to the de facto legally binding 
status of the American Declaration. See id. at 397. 
 109. E.g., ALVAREZ, supra note 7, at 222. 
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and executive orders to discern the different attributes emphasized by Bradley 
and Kelley, such as type of authority, legal effect, and independence of the 
international body.110 
A paradox that this symposium has revealed, however, is that we know 
relatively little about the topography of formal international delegations 
precisely because such delegations are so pervasive. Barbara Koremenos’ 
article begins to map this uncharted terrain by coding the delegation provisions 
of a random sample of treaties.111 Her analysis reveals that delegations differ by 
issue area and by the complexity of the problems that states seek to resolve.112 It 
also suggests a relationship between delegations and other treaty design 
provisions, implying that delegations affect how states manage the risks of 
international cooperation.113 Similarly, Karen Alter’s article disaggregates 
formal adjudicative delegations to international courts and tribunals into four 
distinct roles or functions, each of which addresses a different type of 
problem.114 
Given that comprehensive empirical information of the kind provided by 
Koremenos and Alter is only now emerging, there is much to be learned from 
analyzing the formal attributes of international delegations.115 But a deeper 
understanding of the causes and consequences of delegation often requires 
looking beyond treaty texts and institutional design features to consider how 
allocated authority is actually exercised.116 This is especially true for IOs with 
large secretariats or heterogeneous memberships, whose formal rules can mask 
asymmetric distributions of power.117 Examining the operation of IOs may 
 
 110. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 17–25. 
 111. Barbara Koremenos, When, What, and Why do States Choose to Delegate?, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (Winter 2008). 
 112. See id. 
 113. Id. at 176–79; see also Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005) 
(analyzing tradeoffs between treaty denunciation clauses and other treaty risk-management 
provisions). 
 114. Karen J. Alter, Delegating Sovereignty to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding 
Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 62 (Winter 2008). 
 115. Michael Tierney’s contribution to this symposium makes this point most forcefully. See Michael 
J. Tierney, Delegation Success and Policy Failure: Collective Delegation and the Search for Iraqi 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 286 (Winter 2008) (“If we want to explain 
(or judge) the choices of states, the behavior of IOs, or the outcomes within and around international 
institutions, then a focus on the formal decision rules within IOs and official mandates issued by 
member states is an underappreciated research strategy.”). 
 116. Michael Tierney cautions that, because “informal rules and norms are more difficult to identify 
ex ante, analysts will disagree on the substance of informal rules purportedly guiding behavior in any 
given case.” Under these conditions, he warns, “‘testing’ hypotheses can degenerate into spin control, 
cherry-picked cases, and literary criticism.” Id. I disagree with Tierney’s statement to the extent that it 
includes longstanding, unofficial practices that have no formal pedigree in an IO’s founding charter—
such as the ILO Office’s nearly ninety-year history of interpreting international labor treaties. In 
addition, the lack of agreement on informal rules (to the extent it exists) reflects the fact that scholars 
often ignore informal IO practices even where they have measurable real-world effects. Giving more 
systematic attention to these issues rather than ignoring them can help to distinguish informal practices 
that are theoretically consequential from those that are not. 
 117. See Steinberg, supra note 86, at 350–67 (analyzing how powerful nations exploited the 
GATT/WTO’s formal negotiating rules to capture asymmetric gains at the expense of weaker states). 
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reveal, for example, that delegations with modest official pedigrees in fact 
reflect more capacious transfers of authority. Conversely, delegations that 
appear highly sovereignty-restrictive on paper may turn out to be far less 
constraining in practice. 
The history of the ILO suggests that informal expansions of delegated 
authority are often initiated by IO officials with the acquiescence or approval of 
member states. There are at least two reasons why such expansions are likely to 
remain unofficial, at least in the short term. First, amending the ground rules 
under which international institutions operate is a cumbersome and time-
consuming process. Second, even when member states benefit by allowing IO 
officials to exercise powers outside their formal mandates, the publicity that 
accompanies the codification of such expanded authority may precipitate a 
domestic political backlash. For both reasons, member states may prefer that 
IO officials exercise their augmented authority outside official channels of 
power. Studies that consider only the formal attributes of IOs will overlook 
these important delegated powers. 
Analyses restricted to formal treaty provisions can also fall prey to the 
converse error—incorrectly identifying modest delegations as consequential. 
According to one recent study, for example, a statistically significant number of 
treaties that address complex cooperation problems include provisions for 
external third-party dispute settlement by international tribunals or 
arbitrators.118 This finding suggests that states recognize the benefits of 
delegating broad adjudicatory authority to international jurists to help resolve 
complex transborder problems. However, this study overlooks the fact that 
states often file reservations to exempt themselves from these dispute- 
settlement provisions.119 And even when they do not unilaterally opt out of these 
clauses, states only rarely submit treaty disputes to international tribunals.120 As 
a result, what appears on paper to be a capacious delegation is in fact far more 
limited. 
Once scholars recognize the need to consider the exercise of delegated 
authority, they face the difficult task of understanding the day-to-day workings 
of international institutions, the relationship between those institutions and the 
political and geostrategic environments in which they are embedded, and the 
 
 118. Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution 
Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 194–207 (2007). 
 119. See Anne Peters, International Dispute Settlement: A Network of Cooperational Duties, 14 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 1, 20–21 (2003) (noting that reservations to dispute-settlement clauses are pervasive, but 
arguing against their validity). 
 120. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 285–86 (1997) (“[S]tates are reluctant to sue one another. The 
decision to invoke the jurisdiction of an international tribunal, even where it is available in the context 
of a specific dispute, inevitably involves a host of political and legal considerations.”); Laurence R. 
Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPs Agreement: The Case for a European Human 
Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357, 361 & n.14 (1998) (explaining that “no state has ever 
challenged another’s laws under the . . . cumbersome dispute settlement mechanisms” contained in 
several multilateral intellectual-property agreements). 
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different ways that member states wield power and influence. Such information 
lends itself to qualitative studies that investigate the workings of one or a small 
number of institutions in depth. These fine-grained analyses can provide useful 
complements to econometric studies that survey the legal and political 
landscape from a higher elevation. 
C. The Changing Costs and Benefits of International Delegations 
Third and finally, the history of the ILO demonstrates that international 
delegations can change substantially over time. Bradley and Kelley recognize 
that the sovereignty costs of delegations are not static.121 Oona Hathaway’s 
article also provides an extended treatment of this topic. Hathaway considers 
the time-inconsistent preferences of states and delegation’s unintended 
consequences. But her principal interest lies in identifying when shifting 
preferences and outcomes undermine the domestic legitimacy of international 
delegations.122 
An antecedent issue is understanding when and why IOs evolve after they 
have been established and how that evolution alters the costs and benefits of 
international cooperation. Scholars have made substantial progress in 
explaining why states create IOs.123 But they have devoted far less attention to 
the equally consequential issue of IO change. As Michael Tierney and 
Catherine Weaver have recently written, the theoretical and empirical questions 
to be addressed include 
who or what catalyzes such formal or informal change of/in IOs and how is a 
consensus on the direction of change attained (if at all)? Is this fundamentally driven 
by principals in a response to changes in rational interests or shifting domestic/global 
norms? Or do IOs, as bureaucratic actors, strategically initiate specific reforms in 
anticipation of challenges in their external environments? . . . [W]hat enables or 
constrains principals and/or IOs themselves from changing the formal and/or informal 
rules that drive organizational actions?124 
One reason why these important questions remain unanswered is that the 
rational choice and principal–agent theories that dominate the study of 
international cooperation generally ignore shifts in state preferences, and IOs as 
autonomous actors. Considering these issues opens up opportunities for 
theorizing institutional change. When preferences shift—in response to external 
shocks or changes in domestic politics, for example—states may assign IOs new 
 
 121. See Bradley & Kelley, supra note 1, at 31 (discussing changes in sovereignty costs resulting 
from recent International Court of Justice decisions interpreting the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations). 
 122. Hathaway, supra note 14, at 123–33. 
 123. See Michael Barnett & Liv Coleman, Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in 
International Organizations, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 593, 593–94 (2005) (“We know a lot about the 
conditions under which states will establish IOs, why states will design them the way they do, and some 
of the conditions under which states will grant autonomy to IOs.”). 
 124. Michael Tierney & Catherine Weaver, Principles and Principals? The Possibilities for 
Theoretical Synthesis and Scientific Progress in the Study of International Organizations 12–13 (2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (citations omitted). 
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functions. In addition, as the ILO’s history reveals, many IO officials are 
independent strategic actors who have the autonomy to set agendas and select 
tasks that chart a course away from an institution’s origins. Developing more 
precise theories of the causes and consequences of institutional change would 
significantly enrich the interdisciplinary study of international delegation.125 
IV 
LESSONS OF THE ILO FOR OTHER INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS 
What lessons does the ILO hold for delegations to other IOs? One way to 
answer this question is to consider whether the ILO’s power to monitor 
adherence to unratified treaties and nonbinding recommendations—what 
Frederic Kirgis colorfully labels as “the ILO super-treaty system”—can be 
replicated in other venues. According to Kirgis, 
[S]uch a super-treaty system is simply not subject to replication outside the ILO. It 
was developed when the ILO was a much smaller and more homogenous organization 
than it (or any specialized agency) is now; it is tailored in part to the ILO’s unique, 
tripartite system of representation; there are some economic incentives to make it 
work; and it covers a nontechnical, rather well-defined field (labor relations) that 
lends itself to a supervisory system relying heavily on independent experts.126 
As this article illustrates, however, the delegation of authority to monitor 
adherence to unconsented-to international rules is in fact quite common, 
notwithstanding the tension such delegation creates with traditional principles 
of state consent.127 But the specific mechanisms of such monitoring differ 
significantly from those exercised by the ILO, reducing the value of cross-
institutional comparisons. A more theoretically interesting way to answer to the 
question posed above, therefore, is to analyze the functions that such 
monitoring delegations serve. 
Consider transborder problems that can be modeled as collaboration games 
such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Collaboration games underlie delegations in 
many issue areas, including trade, environmental protection, and arms control. 
IOs created pursuant to these delegations face the same basic problem—how to 
convince all affected nations to participate in the organization and adhere to its 
rules rather than free-ride on the efforts of other states.128 
International agreements solve this problem in different ways. In the trade 
context, the WTO links disparate treaties into a global package-deal that must 
 
 125. For a more detailed treatment of these theories, see Helfer, supra note 16, at 657–71. 
 126. Kirgis, supra note 7, at 119; see also Helfer, supra note 16, at 720–26 (considering the ILO’s 
relevance to international law and politics). 
 127. See supra Parts I & III.A. Kirgis recognizes that selected features of the ILO’s distinctive 
powers could be replicated in other IOs. See Kirgis, supra note 7, at 119. 
 128. See SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 195–220 (2003) (analyzing the importance of membership rules in 
promoting international cooperation); George W. Downs et al., Managing the Evolution of 
Multilateralism, 52 INT’L ORG. 397, 398 (1998) (same). 
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be accepted by all member states.129 Environmental treaties use an iterative 
approach that pairs the creation of framework agreements and protocols with 
the delegation of authority to bind states to treaty amendments adopted by a 
majority or supermajority vote.130 Still other treaties pair deep substantive 
commitments with strong enforcement mechanisms to deter states from 
reneging on their promises.131 
International labor standards can also be conceptualized as a collaboration 
game.132 To prevent countries from competing for foreign investment by 
progressively reducing domestic work-protection rules, all countries (or at least 
all those with sizable export markets) must commit themselves not to enter this 
self-defeating race to the bottom. But how to achieve such a result? The 
international legislature championed by workers and even a few governments at 
the time of the ILO’s founding is one option.133 But the rejection of that 
proposal and others like it demonstrates “the reluctance of states to endow 
[international] agencies with broad, formal legislative powers.”134 
A delegation that authorizes an IO to monitor compliance with unratified 
treaties and other formally nonbinding standards may provide an alternative 
mechanism to reach an equilibrium in which states adhere to, rather than 
violate, international rules. It does so in two distinct ways: first, by making it 
more costly for states to defect, and second, by modifying the game’s underlying 
structure to eliminate or reduce the incentive to defect in the first instance. 
The 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
illustrates both of these functions.135 First, by committing all states to a core 
group of labor standards as a condition of membership in the ILO, the 
Declaration reduces the competitive advantages to any state of refraining from 
ratifying fundamental labor conventions. The several hundred ratifications of 
these treaties in the years since the Declaration’s adoption suggests that such a 
 
 129. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 398, 442 (1996–97) (characterizing agreements relating to services and intellectual 
property as part of “global package deals” negotiated within the GATT/WTO). 
 130. See Brunnée, supra note 101, ¶¶ 11–34 (reviewing numerous examples). 
 131. See George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About 
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 383 (1996); James McCall Smith, The Politics of Dispute Settlement 
Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts, 54 INT’L ORG. 137, 148 (2000) (stating that “the 
more ambitious the level of proposed integration, the more willing political leaders should be to 
endorse legalistic dispute settlement”). 
 132. The protection of international labor standards has been modeled using two collaboration 
games—the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Stag Hunt. See Brian A. Langille, Re-Reading the Preamble to 
the 1919 ILO Constitution in Light of Recent Data on FDI and Worker Rights, 42 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 87, 91–92 (2003); Alan Hyde, A Game-Theory Account and Defence of Transnational 
Labour Standards—A Preliminary Look at the Problem, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF 
LABOUR LAW 143, 146–51 (John D.R. Craig & S. Michael Lynk eds., 2006). 
 133. See supra Part II.A. 
 134. Kirgis, supra note 7, at 142. 
 135. See supra Part II.D. 
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reduction has in fact occurred.136 In addition, the Declaration’s authorization to 
ILO officials to collect and publicize information about each member country’s 
labor practices without regard to the treaties it has formally approved has made 
it more difficult for states to cheat surreptitiously and capture those unilateral 
advantages. 
The Declaration also has a second and more profound function—to 
demonstrate that “flows of trade and investment do not create inexorable 
pressure on each country to lower its labour standards so as to attain 
comparative advantage.”137 A growing number of empirical studies conclude 
that “[i]nvestment is attracted, not repelled, by adherence to core labor 
standards.”138 The Declaration’s monitoring mechanisms have reinforced the 
findings of these studies, helping to convince governments that compliance with 
international labor rules is both “individually and collectively rational.”139 This 
reduction of the incentive to defect has allowed the ILO to focus on technical 
assistance and capacity-building that increases the benefits of treaty compliance 
for all member countries. 
To be sure, delegations of authority to monitor adherence to unratified 
treaties cannot always so neatly realign state incentives. But the ILO’s history 
of expanding and adapting its monitoring powers reveals that such delegations 
can provide valuable information to states and nonstate actors, information that 
enhances the benefits of compliance with international rules without incurring 
the higher sovereignty costs of formally binding states to unconsented-to legal 
obligations. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the history of the ILO’s delegated authority to 
monitor compliance with unratified treaties and nonbinding recommendations. 
It has explained how ILO officials initially claimed this authority by broadly 
interpreting the powers granted to them under the first ILO constitution 
adopted in 1919. Rather than reign in this unauthorized assertion of monitoring 
powers, ILO member states codified and expanded it when they revised the 
organization’s constitution after the Second World War. They created a 
complaints procedure authorizing workers to challenge violations of treaties 
that a state had not ratified, and they adopted a Declaration and follow-up 
mechanism that made adherence to fundamental labor rights a condition of 
membership in the ILO, even for states that had not acceded to treaties 
 
 136. See Int’l Lab. Office, Comm. on Legal Issues and Int’l Lab. Standards, Ratification and 
Promotion of Fundamental ILO Conventions, GB.297/LILS/6, at 1 (Nov. 2006), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb297/pdf/lils-6.pdf. 
 137. Hyde, supra note 132, at 162 n.25. 
 138. Langille, supra note 132, at 93; see also Hyde, supra note 132, at 162 n.25 (citing numerous 
empirical studies). 
 139. Langille, supra note 132, at 96. 
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protecting those rights. Taken together, these developments challenge the 
conventional wisdom that the delegation of authority to the ILO involves only 
modest sovereignty costs. 
This article has also used the ILO’s history to emphasize the importance of 
studying delegations that authorize IOs to monitor compliance with nonbinding 
international rules—a type of delegation that exists in many issue areas of 
international relations. Such delegations often arise and thrive outside of the 
formal channels of authority. This makes it essential for scholars to look beyond 
treaty texts and institutional design features to consider how power is actually 
exercised within IOs and how the costs and benefits of international delegations 
can change over time. 
Finally, this article has considered what insights the ILO offers for 
delegations to other international bodies. It has argued that granting IOs the 
authority to monitor compliance with unconsented-to legal rules helps to ensure 
that all member states address international cooperation problems in some 
fashion, rather than free-ride on the efforts of other countries. The creation and 
expansion of these monitoring powers in the ILO suggests that the member 
states of other IOs may wish to consider the benefits of delegating such 
authority as a way to enhance interstate cooperation. 
